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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

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TO :

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.  
AmEmbassy BONN

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SUBJECT: Transmitting Tripartite Berlin Recommendations on Contingency Plans

The British, French and US Acting Political Advisors met pursuant to the instructions contained in the first two paragraphs of the referenced telegram. The Acting French Political Advisor, as tripartite chairman for the month, drafted the paper containing the tripartitely agreed views of the Political Advisors. A translation of this paper is enclosed. Inasmuch as instructions from the French Embassy in Bonn to the French Mission in Berlin differed from those sent the British and US Missions, certain points covered in the paper are not relevant to the instructions received by the British and US. The topics appear in the same order as received by the French from their Embassy.

Following are the supplementary comments of USBER on the attached recommendations.

3. Date Stamps

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By HR-m/sg

NARA, Date

5/20/91

The paper as written does not make crystal clear the fact that the Political Advisors agreed that the travel orders should be stamped by the appropriate Allied Military Policeman at the Allied checkpoints both entering and leaving the Soviet Zone. As it is recommended that movement orders be prepared in the original with four copies, the MP at the exit checkpoint would affix the date and time stamp on the three remaining copies of the traveller's movement orders when the traveller exits through the Allied control points. This procedure is recommended (1) to give the MPs a standard procedure not involving the exercise of discretion between inbound and outbound traffic and (2) to permit the continued use of round-trip movement orders.

The last two sentences of this paragraph may be disregarded as neither the British nor the United States follow the French present practice of affixing a detailed time and date stamp to the travel orders. The French will presumably abandon use of this stamp with inauguration of the new procedures.

5. Canvas Tops on Trucks

This topic was not listed in the reference telegram as a subject for consideration and the United States representative did enter into discussion on this issue.

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6. (a) Papers for Merchandise (by rail)

The international documents referred to in this section could continue in use in either agency or non-agency situation. As neither the British nor the French currently submit a "train consist" to the Soviets (as US does on demand of Soviet guard) this document could be eliminated.

(b) by Autobahn. This paragraph does not make clear that the present convoy movement form with a German translation added would be attached to a flag movement order which would be made out in the name of the convoy commander. We recommend that in either an agency or non-agency situation, the convoy movement order form continue in use.

7. Attached Documents for Rail Journeys

The document referred to in this section is the "head count." It is the first paper presented by the train commanders to the Soviet Checkpoint Officer when they alight from the train at the Marienborn Checkpoint. The Ambassador's "instructions" refer to the Embassy's Despatch 1866, June 15, 1959.

\* \* \* \* \*

Section II

1. This part makes reference to the present British and French practice of issuing movement orders for travel over the autobahn to French and British nationals driving vehicles licensed in either France or England. With certain exceptions (i.e. MAAG and US Embassy vehicles having German license plates and personnel newly-assigned to Berlin making initial trip to Berlin with US license plates) it is not the present United States practice to issue movement orders to persons travelling in cars other than those licensed by U.S. military authorities. The French and British desire to continue their present practice on the basis that the Soviets have so far not objected to use of French and British license plates.

2. In other words, whereas a list containing the names of passengers should in a non-agency situation be attached to the flag movement order made out in the name of the train commander or the driver of a private automobile, in the case of military vehicles--singly or in convoy--it is recommended that the present movement order (with German translation) referred to in Section 6 (b) be attached to the flag movement order of the convoy commander instead of a list containing the names of the convoy personnel.

3. The Political Advisors held differing views on use of the "Laufzettel" (barrier pass). While agreeing in the event of non-agency situation it should be permissible to continue accept a Laufzettel as is the present practice, (since it represents an order from the checkpoint to the barrier guard to open the barrier), the United States representative did not believe that Allied travellers should accept back from the Vopo the travel movement order form given the Vopos at the checkpoint, even to use this form in lieu of a "Laufzettel." To do so

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would appear to be in conflict with A (1) c of the enclosure to the Embassy's despatch 1866 of June 15, 1959.

4. United States Acting Political Advisor did not agree to sending an Allied officer to explain to the GDR Vopos our intentions regarding checkpoint procedures. It was suggested, and the French and British agreed, that West German or West Berlin police might be used for this purpose providing there was not an undue risk that they would be subject to arrest or detainment should they enter into the Soviet Zone as they are presently prohibited from doing. The entire subject of future contact with the Vopos is one which will require careful consideration by the Allies should the present contingency plans be put into force.

7. This section does not spell out clearly the fact that the Political Advisors agreed that once the Vopos have taken over control of the checkpoints it is essential that ordinary passenger traffic on the autobahn be initially stopped. An experienced officer, fully conversant of the technicalities of Allied contingency plans, should then make the first test run to determine the extent of, and Vopo intentions with regard to control of Allied traffic.

8. This paragraph means that the French will have to instruct their train commanders whether they should ~~resist entry~~ or, like the British and U.S., resist entry without use of arms. ~~SENSITIVE INFORMATION DELETED~~ (b)(1) STATE

10. While present instructions are written stating that movement orders will be stamped "before the train crosses into the Soviet Zone", it was agreed that in effect it was intended that the orders be stamped at the time the train departs from the station - either Berlin or Helmstedt - as the stations are both located approximately at the Zonal borders.

\* \* \* \*

Neither the French nor British were instructed to comment regarding a possible change in documents used by BASC. However, present practice is to give only one small 2x6 card to the Soviet BASC controller. This card contains routine flight information and is printed in English and is modeled after an ICAC form in use throughout the world. No changes should be necessary in this form.

Enclosure: *H*

Translation of Tripartite  
Recommendations on Contingency Plans

Distribution: POLAD USAREUR (2)  
Department (3)  
AmEmbassy Bonn (3)

For the Acting Assistant Chief of Mission:

*William B. Kelly*  
William B. Kelly  
Acting Chief  
Political Affairs Section

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